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Utilitarian Analysis of the Objectives
of Criminal Plea Negotiation and
Negotiation Strategy Choice
I. INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining has been described as an "essential component of the
administration of justice ....If every criminal charge was subjected to a full-scale
trial, the states and federal government would need to multiply by many times the
'
number of judges and court facilities." Categorizing plea bargaining as a form of
"alternative" dispute resolution may seem awkward to many practitioners because
plea bargaining is more common than going to trial. Negotiating an agreement on
a defendant's plea, however, is similar in many ways to civil suit arbitration,
mediation, or negotiation and should be studied as a subset of dispute resolution
techniques.
The primary similarity of criminal plea negotiating and civil dispute resolution
is that a trial is obviated, which saves time and expense and eliminates the
uncertainty of a verdict. Further, in both situations parties participate in the process
voluntarily. The voluntary nature of a plea agreement makes satisfaction with the
outcome more likely. Since appeals are usually avoided, final resolution can be
reached more quickly, however, as with some other forms of civil dispute resolution,
the plea agreement must be approved by a court.
This article examines the repercussions of choosing a negotiating style for the
present criminal case on the actions of opposing counsel in future cases. It
scrutinizes the criminal plea negotiating process from the perspective of both a
prosecuting attorney and a defense attorney. It analyzes this process using two
philosophical theories: act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.
This article asserts that the result of a negotiation employing the strategy that
is the optimal strategy for that particular negotiation will, by definition, result in the
optimal outcome for that negotiation. Nevertheless, the aggregate result of a series
of negotiations employing the strategy that is optimal for each individual negotiation
may not result in the optimal aggregate outcome after a series of negotiations. The
decision of which strategy to use becomes complicated when the optimal outcome
of a series of negotiations results from the use of the optimal series strategy and not
the use of the optimal strategy for a singular negotiation. In this situation defense
lawyers face an ethical dilemma: should a defense attorney employ the optimal
negotiation strategy for the present plea negotiation knowing that it will be
detrimental to his ability to negotiate in the future with a particular prosecutor or in
a particular jurisdiction? In other words, should a defense attorney sacrifice his
ability to serve future clients by vigorously serving the interests of his present client?
The same dilemma confronts prosecutors who are on the other side of the
negotiation process. Prosecutors may neglect the interests of the public if they lose

I. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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sight of the effect a particular negotiation will have on future negotiations by
submitting to caseload pressure and granting concessions to defense lawyers when
threatened with a costly, hard-fought court battle. Similarly, prosecutors, at times,
should make an apparently irrational decision to spend an excessive amount of time
and effort on a case to favorably adjust defense bar expectations.
II. PLEA BARGAINING AS ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Negotiation strategy is "the negotiator's planned and systematic attempt to
move the negotiation process toward a resolution favorable to his client's interests., 2
As with all negotiation situations, there are several strategies from which to choose.
A. Negotiation Strategies
The competitive strategy "seeks to force the opposing party to a settlement
favorable to the negotiator by convincing the opponent that his case is not as strong
as previously thought and that he should settle the case."3 One tactic employed by
such negotiators is to open with a high initial demand.' In the criminal setting, this
is most apparent when a prosecutor "throws the book" at a defendant by charging
crimes more severe than a reasonable jury would support and crimes so trivial and
numerous that defense counsel knows the prosecutor will not pursue them to
conviction. Throughout the negotiations on a single case, competitive negotiators
limit the disclosure of information on the facts of the case and do not reveal their
preference and expectation of an outcome.5 Because the primary objective is to
"win" and to force the opponent to "lose," the few concessions that are made
are
minor.6 Further, threats and arguments are often used to reach a favorable
settlement.7 Finally, a competitive negotiator will employ false issues and feign
commitment to positions that may be compromised without consequence.'
In contrast to competitive negotiators, cooperative negotiators "make
concessions to build trust in the other party and encourage further concession on his
part."9 Such negotiators open with a moderate bid that is barely acceptable to the
opponent.'l When the opponent opens with such a bid, the two negotiators "should
determine the midpoint between the two opening bids and regard it as a fair and
equitable outcome.""

2. Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 41,47 (1985).
3. Id.at46.
4. Id.at 48-49.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.at 46.
10. Id.at53.
11. Id.
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A third type of negotiator is the integrative negotiator. This type "seeks to find
2
solutions to the conflict which satisfy the interests of both parties."' Integrative
strategies are most useful when the parties have interests that are not directly
opposed.'" They are least useful in zero-sum game type situations where the parties
are dividing a set amount of resources. 4 There are several keys to proper integrative
negotiations. Negotiators try to separate themselves from the problem and focus
5
A variety of possible
more on the interest involved than the positions held.
is reached.' 6
decision
final
the
before
parties
the
outcomes are generated by
Integrative negotiators use tactics that differ greatly from competitive
negotiators but which are similar to cooperative negotiators. For example,
integrative negotiators freely exchange information on their motives, goals, and
8
values.' 7 They also brainstorm to invent options for mutual gains' and make
9
concessions on some issues to prompt the other negotiator to concede others.
Integrative negotiators also seek to diminish the costs of their opponents'
concessions.20
B. Plea Negotiation Process
The plea negotiation process, for present purposes, begins when the prosecutor
files charges against a defendant. "The initial charge is usually a high demand both
because the prosecutor has overcharged and because legislatively defined criminal
sentences are generally unrealistically lengthy."'" The initial charge also serves as
a threat that if the defendant does not enter a plea agreement, he risks being
22
convicted on more serious charges and receiving a longer sentence. The prosecutor
is able to make a high initial demand because he "is vested with virtually unfettered
charging discretion., 23 Usually the opening demand "mirrors what would be
expected from a negotiator [sic] who follows the competitive strategy: a high, but
credible, demand.' 24
At some point either just before or after the charge is filed, the defendant
usually procures legal counsel. Following defense counsel's investigation of the
facts of the case, he suggests a plea agreement. Where an agreement is reached, the
prosecutor makes a recommendation to the court, with which courts rarely

Id. at 46.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 69.
at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 56.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Rodney J. Uphoff, The CriminalDefense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach
2 CLINICAL L. REv. 73, 89 (1995).
24. Gifford, supra note 2, at 74.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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disagree.25 Although there is no constitutional right to plea bargain,26 a defendant
may enter a guilty plea,27 and by entering a guilty plea, effectively admitting all of
the elements of the crime charged.28
Plea negotiation is quite common. According to one criminal defense attorney,
plea negotiation is attempted in all cases with the "vast majority" of criminal cases
being resolved through plea negotiation.29 It has been estimated that over ninety
percent of all state court criminal convictions are based on negotiated pleas.3°
National statistics indicate that 92 percent of all felony state court convictions result
from guilty pleas.3
The effects of plea negotiating are as widespread as the breadth of its use. Plea
agreements relieve pressure on the judicial system, eliminate the uncertainty of the
outcome, and save time and money. The defendant accepts responsibility by
admitting his wrongdoing but receives less punishment than what he would have
likely received if found guilty.
Attorneys involved in criminal plea negotiations are under several ethical duties
specific to plea negotiation. As with attorneys in general, "neither defense counsel
nor the prosecutor may lie during negotiations."32 More specific to plea negotiations,
defense attorneys are ethically obligated to refrain from compromising the
representation of one client in order to serve the interests of other clients.33 Defense
attorneys are also ethically bound to fight zealously on behalf of their clients even
though their stance and efforts may irritate or offend a prosecutor who has the power
to affect the disposition of the defense attorney's other cases.34 In other words,
defense attorneys must seek to secure the best result for the present client even
though it may harm their ability to secure favorable plea agreements for future
clients.33 Criminal defense attorneys are not representing a cause or other present or
potential clients, but the defendant they happen to be representing at that particular
moment.36 Prosecutors, on the other hand, owe their first duty to justice.37

25. Uphoff, supra note 23, at 89.
26. Ray Hasu & Patrick Curran, Twenty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure,85 GEO. L.J.
1136 (1997).
27. Id. at 1144.
28. Id. at 1145.
29. Uphoff, supra note 23, at 77.
30. James A. Cramer etal., The JudicialRole in Plea Bargaining,in PLEA BARGAINING 139, 139
(William F. McDonald & James A. Cramer eds., 1980).
31. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE BULLETIN: FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE

COURT 1992 9 (1995).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Uphoff, supra note 23, at 123.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.9 (1995).

Uphoff, supra note 23, at 90.
Id. at 130.
Id.

37. G. NICHOLAS

HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING
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III. UTILITARIANISM: ACT AND RULE

Defense attorneys are occasionally confronted with the dilemma of whether
they should negotiate in such a way as to best advance a present client's interests
even though it will impair the lawyer's ability to negotiate favorable plea agreements
for future clients. As a result of an overly competitive style an otherwise cooperative
prosecutor may be pushed into a competitive position in future plea negotiations and
thus increase the aggregate level of punishment doled out to criminal defendants.
This ethical issue is best analyzed using two variants of the philosophical theory
of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that the correct answer to a problem is the one
that maximizes "utility."38 Utility of a defense attorney is generally the lessening of
the amount of punishment to which a defendant must submit in order to convince a
prosecutor to enter a plea agreement. The correct choice is the one that will result
in the least amount of punishment. However, the question posed here is, whose
punishment? Is the punishment of the present defendant the sole concern of the
defense attorney or is punishment of other defendants, both present and future, the
sole concern of the defense attorney? One may think that these two interests do not
conflict, and this may well be true in most instances, but in some cases acting to
maximize utility for the present client may not be the act that maximizes the
aggregate utility of all defendants. The distinction between the act that maximizes
utility presently and the act that will maximize utility in the aggregate is the subject
of the debate between what is known as act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.
Act utilitarianism asserts that "[a] voluntary action is right, whenever and only
when no other action possible to the agent under the circumstances would have
39
This statement of the theory
caused more pleasure; in all other cases, it is wrong."
the
purposes of this Article,
For
of
pain.
instead
assumes that utility is pleasure
"pleasure," in the case of a defense lawyer, can be thought of as lessening the amount
of punishment that is received pursuant to a plea agreement, and in the case of a
prosecutor, "pleasure" can be read as the accomplishment of justice.
Rule utilitarianism asserts that "the rightness of an act is fixed, not by its
relative utility, but by the utility of having a relevant moral rule, or of most or all
40
In other words, a decision
members of a certain class of acts being performed.,
in all similar circumstances,
applied
when
maker should determine a rule that,
maximizes utility, whatever it may be, and then act accordingly in the present
situation.

IV. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND DEFENSE LAWYER UTILITY
Utility differs in the criminal plea negotiation context depending on whether
one is a prosecutor or a defense lawyer. As the circumstances of each case differ,
so does the "utility." The discussion below centers around the various forms that
utility may take.

38. G.E. MOORE, ETHICS (1912).
39. Id.
40. RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RGHTS 114
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A. Prosecutors
A prosecutor is under a duty to seek justice, not to simply seek conviction.4'
Beyond this duty, a prosecutor's objectives and motives are mixed. "The
prosecutor's goal is not to maximize the length of the defendant's sentence or even
the severity of the crime to which the defendant pleads., 42 In many cases, however,
43
they "are most interested in obtaining a conviction.,
A prosecutor's basic objective during a plea negotiation is to reach an
agreement on punishment that approximates the result a judge or jury would reach
if the defendant were convicted at trial." Prosecutors view their role as one of trying
to "individualize justice" by considering "the circumstances of the offense and the
45
characteristics of the offender.,
Prosecutors generally begin negotiations from a starting point or "standard
deal" that is based on the nature of the charge and the defendant's criminal record.46
The extent to which a prosecutor ultimately will be willing to deviate from
that "standard deal" generally depends on a host of factors including: time
and resources; defense counsel's ability, reputation and relationship with
the prosecutor; evidentiary concerns; the victim's wishes; and the
aggravating and the mitigating circumstances of the case.47
Empirical studies suggest that prosecutors attempt to individualize justice by taking
several factors into account.4 8 For example, they consider the circumstances of the
offense, the characteristics of the offender (e.g. the youth of the defendant), prior
criminal record, and whether there was provocation by the victim.49 These factors
provide the formula for a prosecutor to use in considering whether to make
concessions during negotiations. ° Prosecutors and judges also recognize the
significance of substance abuse and mental health problems and, to varying degrees,
attempt to respond to such circumstances in plea negotiating and sentencing. 5 1
In addition to factors arising out of a particular case, prosecutors may consider
the need for retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation. As with public defenders,
prosecutors' offices lack sufficient resources to adequately investigate, prepare, and
try many cases. 2 The expense of going to trial may factor into a prosecutor's
decision on how hard to negotiate. Other factors include: "pressures from judges

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Herman, supra note 37, at 14.
Gifford, supra note 2, at 75.
Id. at 78.
Herman, supra note 37, at 5.
Gifford, supra note 2, at 81.
Uphoff, supra note 23, at 105.
Id.
Gifford, supra note 2, at 75.
Id.
Id.
Uphoff, supra note 23, at 106.
Id. at 88.
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and large caseloads to reach agreement, . . . [a prosecutor's] continuing relationship
with defense attorneys, . . . [and] the prevailing cooperative norms of plea
bargaining."53 A prosecutor may also receive pressure to more vigorously pursue a
case from the victim of the crime or from the community if the case is well
publicized. However, "in most cases the prosecutor can afford to adopt a
noncompetitive rather than a competitive strategy because she is not highly
accountable to a constituent.""
B. CriminalDefense Lawyers
Defense lawyers, because they represent one client instead of the public at
large, have, or should have, as their primary objective the interest of their client. As
55
one commentator relays, defendants are most interested in reducing the sentence.
their
to
trial,
goes
Criminal defense lawyers are aware that if a defendant's case
clients are likely to receive a more severe sentence if convicted than if the defendant
had pleaded guilty.56 The message that defendants who go to trial will get stiffer
sentences if convicted is sent from trial judges.57
Defense lawyers may also be concerned with getting an appropriate punishment
or treatment for clients with special problems such as drug addiction or aggressive
tendencies. In the case of many clients, money is also a great concern. "Too few
criminal defendants can really afford to pay the cost of mounting an effective
defense.' 58 As one criminal defense lawyer put it, "[m]any think, because O.J.
Simpson was so rich, he could worm out of the charge. But his wealth merely
allowed him to stand toe-to-toe with the state."59 In cases with less well-to-do clients
"economic pressures often eliminate the criminal defendant's right to trial as a viable
option.,60
Defense lawyers may become self-interested. The defense lawyer's plea
negotiating style will frequently be affected by a desire to, "maintain good working
relationships with the prosecutor and the judge."6 It has been observed that
prosecutors punish lawyers who are too adversarial in representing their clients by
refusing to grant the standard plea bargaining concessions to these attorneys'
clients. 62 Defense lawyers who aggressively fight for a client in one case may
become concerned that the prosecutor will be more strict with their other clients.63

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 76.
Uphoff, supra note 23, at 87.
Id. at 85.
Interview with Confidential Source, in Columbia, Mo. (Oct. 1997).
Id.
Gifford, supra note 2, at 76.
Id. at 78.
Uphoff, supra note 23, at 90.
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Justice Brennan observed that:
a lawyer may have a strong interest in having judges and prosecutors think
well of him, and if he is working for a flat fee -- a common arrangement
for criminal defense attorneys -- or if his fees for court appointments are
lower than he would receive for other work, he has an obvious financial
64
incentive to conclude cases on his criminal docket swiftly.
On occasion, defense lawyers may take publicized cases as advertising. In these
cases, the incentive to swiftly conclude a case may be decreased because the attorney
is rewarded for prolonging the case.
One motivation common to all businesses and professions is the goal of making
a profit. "The temptation to undercut the quality of representation provided in order
to maximize one's profits or 'to chum' cases to turn a quick fee, of course, is not
65
unique to the criminal defense bar.,

V. UTILITARIANISM APPLIED TO CRIMINAL PLEA NEGOTIATION
Any of the above-mentioned motivations and objectives can become "utility"
depending on the circumstances of the case. The choice of negotiation style is
determined by what maximizes utility. After the objectives are identified,
prosecutors and defense counsel should consider how best to accomplish those
objectives in the present case and how best to accomplish those objectives in all
cases and decide what course of action will maximize present utility and what course
of action will maximize aggregate utility.
Donald G. Gifford recommends that defense lawyers adopt a noncompetitive
approach when the relationship between the negotiators is likely to continue because
competitive strategies often generate "distrust and ill will." 66 This choice, however,
may negatively impact their current clients' immediate interests. It could also cause
the client to think the attorney's first thought is to "cop out" and may cause harm to
the attorney-client relationship. 67 This ethical dilemma, whether to negotiate as if
there were no tomorrow for the present client or to negotiate so as to get the most
beneficial plea agreements for the present and future clients, presents an unsettling
result. Surely a defense lawyer should not neglect to aggressively negotiate a present
client's case for the benefit of other clients. But by doing what "should" be done, the
defense attorney may ostracize himself from the congenial legal community and
hamper his ability to effectively represent clients in the future.
The choice between present and future clients is not present for prosecutors
who represent the state. However, prosecutors' choice of negotiating style may have
unintended repercussions. For example, if a defense lawyer is aware that the

64.
65.
66.
67.

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Uphoff, supra note 23, at 79.
Gifford, supra note 2, at 65.
Id. at 77-78.
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prosecutor is reluctant to go to trial and eager to dispose of a case, the defense
lawyer will have more leverage than when facing a prosecutor who eagerly wants
to try cases.6 8 "Similarly, defense counsel's poor reputation -- especially as a lawyer69
who never goes to trial -- will severely diminish that lawyer's bargaining power.
"Heavy caseloads pressure many prosecutors to plea bargain most of their cases.
Thus, caseload pressure may provide defense counsel important leverage."70
Defense counsel may be able to win concessions by convincing the prosecutor that
a trial will be a costly, hard-fought battle.7' Thus, the prosecutor may decide that
even though the state will win at trial, the victory may not be worth the time and
effort expended.72
At first blush, it seems counter-intuitive to say that the prosecutor could lower
his caseload pressure by pursuing cases to trial. If, however, the defense bar
recognizes that a prosecutor is granting concessions when at trial because of caseload
pressure, the prosecutor will have intensified the caseload problem. This will
become apparent when more and more defense counsel threaten trial to gain plea
concessions.
Analyzed from a utilitarian perspective, the act of a prosecutor granting
concessions to the present defendant to get a plea may maximize present utility
because even though the defendant will receive less punishment the prosecutor will
have more time to devote to other cases. Once the defense bar recognizes the
prosecutor's reasoning, however, they will take advantage of the pressure on the
prosecutor and threaten trial more often in order to receive concessions. Thus, the
aggregate utility of the decision to grant concessions at the threat of trial to relieve
caseload pressure will be less than the aggregate outcome if the prosecutor would
have recognized the consequences of his act and instead formulated a response to the
threat of trial in a time of caseload pressure that when applied to all such occasions
would have maximized the aggregate outcome, i.e. to not grant concessions to
relieve caseload pressure. In this scenario the decision that maximizes utility for the
prosecutor in the present case, i.e. the decision act utilitarianism dictates, does not
maximize aggregate utility when applied in all similar circumstances. By making
the decision that rule utilitarianism dictates, the prosecutor relieves caseload pressure
by pursuing a case despite the threat of a costly, hard-fought battle.
Similar to the scenario of acquiescing to caseload pressure, prosecutors may
need to take seemingly irrational action to favorably adjust the expectations of the
defense bar. When a prosecutor considers the costs and benefits of taking a case to
trial or entering a plea agreement, the time required to win at trial may greatly
outweigh the increased level of punishment received by the defendant. To gain
better negotiating position, however, the prosecutor may follow through on what is
believed by the defense bar as an idle and irrational threat to take a minor case to
trial. As one prosecutor put it, "[i]f the defense lawyers think the prosecuting
attorney is a little crazy and will spend a ton of money on a case, then the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Uphoff, supra note 23, at 110.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 128.
Id.
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prosecutor's threats won't be idle and the defense lawyers will agree to a settlement
earlier.0 3 If a prosecutor makes a habit of overcharging and always dismissing
charges to reach plea agreements then word will get out. Once it becomes known
that the prosecutor always overcharges, defense lawyers will treat the originally filed
charges lightly and thus undermine the prosecutor's negotiating position.
Aggressively taking a case to trial as charged and not overcharging does not
maximize a prosecutor's present utility. However, once these practices are known
to the defense bar, initial posturing over the severity of the charges and the
prosecutor's commitment to the case will be eliminated and plea negotiations will
begin in earnest more quickly and thereby lessen the amount of time both defense
and prosecution lawyers spend on a single case.

VI. CONCLUSION
Although the result of a negotiation employing the strategy that maximizes
utility for that particular negotiation will, by definition, result in the maximum utility
for that negotiation, the aggregate utility resulting from a series of negotiations
employing, in each case, the strategy that maximizes utility for each particular
negotiation, may not result in the optimal aggregate outcome for the series of
negotiations. Choosing the best strategy to use becomes complicated when the
maximum utility resulting from a series of negotiations is not achieved through the
use of the optimal strategy for each singular negotiation. In this situation defense
lawyers face an ethical dilemma: should a defense attorney employ the optimal
negotiation strategy for the present plea negotiation despite the fact that it will be
detrimental to future negotiations with a particular prosecutor or in a particular
jurisdiction? In other words, should a defense attorney sacrifice his ability to serve
future clients by vigorously serving the interests of his present client?
On the other side of the negotiation process, prosecutors may neglect the
interests of the public if they lose sight of the effect a particular negotiation will have
on future negotiations by submitting to caseload pressure and granting concessions
when threatened by defense counsel with a costly, hard-fought court battle.
Similarly, prosecutors, at times, should make an apparently irrational decision to'
pursue a case by expending excessive amount of time and effort to favorably adjust
defense bar expectations. Whatever the situation, it is important to understand that
what appears to be a good decision today may turn out to be a bad decision
tomorrow.
JOSEPH W. VANOVER

73. Interview with Confidential Source, supra note 59.
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